The use of malicious communication channels is becoming an integral part of malicious software agents and tools including those employed for remote access tools and distributed denial of service tools. These malicious software agents use the unused fields of ICMP and TCP/IP packets to establish malicious communication channels. Since TCP/IP comprises 96% of the traffic, the paper identifies the idle fields in TCP/IP and ICMP messages and proposes the use of a stateless model to protect against the misuse of these unused fields. This paper also presents the advantages of using a stateless model over firewalls and IDS. The proposed modifications are recommended highly for the end hosts and it has been shown that the proposed modifications are computationally inexpensive.
Introduction
Alice and Bob are in a prison that collectively wishes to plan their escape. Since they are in separate areas of the prison, all communication must pass through the warden, Willy. If Willy sees any attempt at secret communication in their messages, he will fail the effort by not allowing them to communicate in near future. In this respect Simmon [1] presents the concept of a subliminal channel. Simmon describes a subliminal channel as one where hidden data piggybacks on an innocuous-looking legitimate communication channel whose existence is undetectable. The warden can either be passive or active. Passive warden is a firewall and the active warden is Intrusion detection system.
The concept of subliminal channel can again be mapped to the real life situation. Besides malicious insider, software agents like worms and viruses are threat to the organizations. Worms and viruses that can be referred to as the malicious agents can enter inside the system and steal the sensitive information even in the presence of a firewall or intrusion detection system. There can be many ways by which malicious agents can enter the system. Proof of this concept was shown in [2] . Not only malicious worms, agents, but also malicious insider have also been one of the threats to the organization, but techniques to stop these insiders are often time-consuming and inadequate. In the example of the admitted FBI spy Robert Hansen [3] , espionage activities were not detected and stopped for over a decade. Mean while, he distributed some of the US government's most classified information directly into the hands of the KGB. According, to his own affidavit, Hansen's [3] success was facilitated by various forms of steganography and other undercover techniques to communicate, the transfer of information.
Again in early February 2000, a distributed denial of service attack was launched against Yahoo, Amazon, eBay and other popular Internet sites. The attacks on Yahoo, eBay, Amazon.com and E*Trade resulted in a loss of approximately $1.2 billion, according to The Yankee Group, a Boston consulting firm. It is reported in [4] that almost all of the tools used on the distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks on Yahoo, Amazon, eBay, and E*Trade internet sites, have used data fields of echo_request/echo_reply messages to establish malicious communications between the DDOS clients and the attacker's handler program. Like unused fields of echo_request/echo_reply, TCP [5] , UDP, and other ICMP messages provide unused fields that can be employed for malicious communications. These unused fields are termed as idle fields.
If under some condition c, during which the field f of a protocol p is not being used, f can be classified as an idle field. For example in the case of ICMP, the payload field of echo_request /echo_reply, which does not carry any useful information, can be regarded as idle under all conditions. If an IP packet is not fragmented, then the sequence number field of such a packet is not required to carry any useful information. Hence, under the condition that an IP packet is not getting fragmented, the sequence number field can be classified as an idle field. Similar to ICMP echo_request /echo_reply, and sequence numbers for unfragmented IP packets, there exist many idle fields in commonly used protocols such as TCP, IP, and ICMP.
To establish a malicious communication channel an attacker can employ either covert or overt channels. The malicious communication channel has been one of the most important recent issues. The malicious communication channel can either be due to the covert channel or it can be due to the overt channels. Covert channel [4] uses entities not normally viewed as data objects to transfer information from one subject to another. The non-data objects such as file lock, device flags, and passing of time are needed to register the state of the system. Channels such as files buffer and I/O are classified as overt channels [6] because the entities used to hold the information are data objects, that is, objects normally viewed as data containers. Both the covert and the overt channel provide the considerable amount of bandwidth and are equally important. An example will help in better understanding how useful fields can be used to send covert information. Let's assume that computer "A" wants to send 16 bits of information to computer "B" covertly. "A" can use some useful field like port number of TCP. To send the bit value 1 covertly "A" establishes a connection to port 1000; and to send 0, it establishes a connection to port 1001. The bandwidth of this channel will be 1 bit per connection. Therefore, to send 16 bits of information using port numbers, 16 connections representing at least 16 IP packets will be required. However, by using idle fields, for example the sequence number field of unfragmented packet, the 16 bits of information can be transmitted using only one IP packet. Even though useful fields can be used to establish malicious covert channels, the use of idle fields is easier to implement and usually provides higher bandwidth than malicious channels using useful fields. In addition, because of the higher bandwidth, it is much more difficult to detect suspect activities when these fields are used.
The idle field characteristics just described make idle fields a good choice for establishing malicious communication. In fact, idle fields have been known to be used for malicious communication, with their most damaging use publicly known been for the coordination of distributed denial of service attacks. Some of the most widely known distributed denial of service attack tools like Tribe Flood Net2K [6] and Stacheldraht rely on ICMP tunneling to establish communication channels between the compromised machine and the hacker's machine. Because of this, the malicious use of idle fields in ICMP messages has been classified as a high-risk security threat by Internet Security Services [1] and SANS [7] . This paper analyzes the idle fields in TCP/IP header and ICMP messages and proposes the usage of a stateless model to prevent the misuse of idle fields. The performance impact of the stateless model for TCP/IP header and ICMP messages is then presented and analyzed using a test bed implementation. The paper ends with the conclusions drawn from the test bed implementation.
Related Work
Various solutions have been proposed and are being used to prevent malicious tunneling. Although every proposed solution has its weaknesses, some of them are becoming integral parts of firewalls and intrusion detection systems. The most commonly used solutions to prevent the misuse of idle fields are as follows.
• Disable the protocol. One can disable a protocol completely or partially either at a host machine or more commonly at a gateway firewall. For example, the disabling of ICMP traffic [1] for echo_request and echo_reply has been proposed as one of the solutions to prevent malicious communications. However, ICMP messages are required to check the status of a network and to communicate IP packet errors. Therefore, disabling all ICMP messages prevents malicious tunneling that abuses idle fields in this protocol, but also prevents its legitimate use. Network intrusion detection generally monitors the 286 traffic and detects attacks of known exploits. They are more customized by the applications. For a reliable detection they focus on detection rather than prevention of vulnerability exploits. Generally IDS uses packet scrubber and the traffic normalize for reliable detection. The main purpose of the normalizer and the packet scrubber is to smoothen the traffic for IDS. Moreover normalizer can itself be prone to various attacks like state holding attacks and CPU overload attacks. Normalizer must be able to reconstruct every TCP stream in a real time. Normalizer also changes the sematics of the stream, which in turn can break some mechanisms, like trace route and Path MTU recovery [9, 10] . Normalizer hence can prevent the malicious communication channel and is not recommended for every system.
• Active mapping.
was proposed in [10] that eliminates the TCP/IP policies of hosts on the network. NIDS then uses these policies. Active mapping avoids semantics and performance problems due to the traffic normalization. However active mapping requires sufficient knowledge about the intranet being monitored. In contrast to all the above-proposed solution, a stateless model for idle fields inside the kernel does not require any state keeping and hence is not prone to state attacks. The proposed solution for the prevention of malicious communication channels using idle fields is a stateless model and does not require any state keeping. Hence it is not prone to any state keeping attacks. Moreover, performance studies show that the stateless model is computationally inexpensive and is recommended for the end host kernel.
Although the techniques above can be used to protect machines in corporate environments that accepts the restrictions imposed, there is a clear need for better protecting personal machines, many times with continual connections to high-speed links. Application level personal firewalls [2] running on personal computers have been proposed as a solution. These firewalls alert the user when an application is attempting to access his/her computer, or the computer is trying to use monitored connections on the Internet. As per the configuration rules, personal firewalls can either block or allow a protocol, irrespective of the fact that the protocol is being used for tunneling. For most users, the blocking of certain protocols is not acceptable and personal firewalls usually end up allowing too many protocols. Ideally, a solution to prevent the misuse of idle fields for covert communication should be transparent, enabling users to safely use any protocol.
Malicious Communication Channel: Case Study
An example application can better help one to understand the extent to which malicious communication can be used for malicious purposes. A remote access tool was chosen as the application used to better understand the capabilities of malicious tunneling. Remote Access Tools are applications that allow a user to access data and gain control over a remote computer.
BO2K [3] , which is a remote access tool, was used to test malicious tunneling. The tunneling was accomplished by moving the communication infrastructure of BO2K to the ICMP protocol. An ICMP echo_request contained the remote command issued by a client of BO2K and an echo_reply contained the information from the machine that was running the BO2K server. Since ICMP uses raw sockets for its communication, root (administrator) privileges are required. For the experimentation purposes it was assumed that the root privileges could be easily obtained. More details about getting root privileges can be found in [11] . In addition, in many commonly used operating systems like Windows ME/98 getting root permission is not required.
Strong authentication and encryption were implemented to hide the communication from intrusion detection systems. The Bellovin and Merritt [12] authentication and key exchange protocol was implemented in the BO2K communication protocol. The session key generated by the Bellovin and Merritt protocol was then used to encrypt the data using 3DES. The server and the client of the modified BO2K were installed on a pair of personal computers. The machines were connected on a local network simulating the Internet and were using a personal firewall [13] as their application level firewall.
Experimental Results
Personal firewalls, customized to allow ICMP packets, were set up such that they raise alarms in the form of pop up windows each and every time they see an incoming or outgoing data packet. Several screenshots that show the results of this experiment are shown in the appendix. The options provided by the personal firewall when an outgoing connection is initiated can be seen in Fig. A-1 and are explained below.
• Incoming Connection Alert/Outgoing Connection Alert-indicates whether the requested connection is outgoing (from the local network or computer) or incoming (from the outside network, e.g. Internet).
• Time-exact time and date, when the connection was requested.
• Remote-information about the remote end-node (IP address, port and communication protocol).
• Details-detailed information about the connection.
• Details about application -information about the local application taking part in the communication (as a client or server). For example, an Internet explorer is trying to access the outside network in Fig. A-1.
• Permit-used to allow the packet to pass through the firewall.
• Deny-used to stop (filter) the caught packet. The BO2K server was installed on a machine simulating a compromised machine and the BO2K client was installed on a machine simulating a malicious user. Both the server and the client machines were running the Windows ME operating system. Figs. A-2.1 and A-3.1 show snapshots of the connection initiation steps. Fig. A-3 .2 that the firewalls report the IP packet as been sent by the kernel. The ICMP mode of communication confounds the firewall providing false information to a user that would be monitoring the connections. Even though ICMP packets are being sent by a remote tool application, the firewall infers that they have been sent by the operating system.
A user at the client machine can issue commands to the compromised machine after exchanging the cryptographic session keys. Fig. A-4 .1 shows the command "dir" being used to view the file listing at the compromised machine. For this session, the command is encrypted as "9f 4c 7c a6 0a 68 78 f5 cf 10 aa b4 a5 0c e6 b2" before being sent to the compromised machine. Fig. A-4 .2 shows the command been sent by using ICMP. Fig. A-5 shows that the compromised machine receives the encrypted command over the ICMP channel, decrypts and executes it, and sends the encrypted results to the client machine.
Thus, from the screen shots of the case study, it can be easily seen that covert channels can be very powerful for communication and firewalls are confused by this kind of communication in some cases. Even though ICMP packets are being used by the application, the personal firewall infers these ICMP packets as the control messages issued by the operating system. In addition, the experiments showed that the ICMP mode of communication provides the same data carrying capability as TCP/UDP mode of communication.
Proposed Solution
Normalization of TCP/IP and ICMP packets is proposed [14] [15] [16] [17] to prevent malicious use of idle fields even if the communication is encrypted, and to enable legitimate usage of the protocols on environments lacking state preserving firewalls and/or intrusion detection systems. The proposed solution enforces semantic consistency amongst the unused idle fields in a packet. The solution requires a common agreement upon the unused fields of the protocols with operating system kernels enforcing the agreement. The packet normalization should be enforced either when a packet is going up the network stack or when a packet is going down the network stack. The proposed model is called a stateless model since unlike state preserving firewall, the proposed stateless model does not require.
The proposed solution is compared to intrusion detection systems and application level firewalls in Table 1 . Intrusion detection system checks the value of each field and raises an alarm in the case of any suspicious content. Application level firewalls, running on personal machines, block the protocol so as to prevent the misuse of fields. The stateless model defines and enforces a value for idle fields. It is possible to see in Table 1 that the stateless model provides advantages over intrusion detection systems and firewalls in most cases. The stateless model can filter encrypted payload, allows protocols to be used freely and is computationally inexpensive. Although the stateless model can prevent malicious tunneling in many situations, particularly those that provide high bandwidth, it cannot prevent every possibility for malicious tunneling. An example of tunneling that it cannot prevent is tunneling using information coded as an IP number of a range of machines, or router, owned by the malicious user. To determine whether a stateless model can be used for a field the following rule should be used.
Rule for the usage of Stateless Model
For a field F in the protocol P, if there exists a condition C such that the value V is not required during C, then defines and enforces a value V for F during C. The value V can either be a fixed value or it can be a random value depending upon the usage of the F.
The rule stated above refers to fields on the TCP/IP suite of protocols. A short summary of TCP/IP and ICMP fields is given in the following subsections in order to remind the reader of the potential fields that can have the rule above applied.
TCP Protocol
TCP is a connection-oriented, end-to-end, reliable protocol designed to fit into a layered hierarchy of protocols that support multi-network applications. The TCP protocol provides for reliable inter-process communication between pairs of processes in host computers attached to distinct but interconnected computer communication networks. The TCP header provides various idle fields that can be used for establishing malicious tunneling. Idle fields in TCP header and its usage for establishing malicious tunneling are explained below.
• Acknowledgement Number. The TCP handshake is a three-step process that computers go through when negotiating a connection. Simplistically described, in a normal TCP handshake: a) Computer A sends a SYN packet b) Computer B acknowledges the connection attempt and sends back its own SYN packet.
c) Computer A acknowledges Computer B's response. When the ACK control bit is set, the acknowledgement number field contains the value of the next sequence number the sender of the segment is expecting to receive. Once a connection is established this sequence number is always sent. A value for the acknowledgement number field is not required when the ACK control bit is not set. Therefore, any acknowledgement number is ignored during the first step of the TCP handshake process. The acknowledgement number is a 32 bit number that can be used to convey covert information. The stateless model can be used to prevent the acknowledgement number from being used for malicious communication. In this case, for the condition that the ACK bit is not set, the value of the acknowledgement field can be enforced to be V , for example zero.
• Reserved. Bits tagged as reserved are not being used currently and are kept for the future use. There are 6 reserved bits. The stateless model is the appropriate solution to make sure that the reserved bits are not being used for malicious tunneling, enforcing them to be V .
• Urgent Pointer. The urgent pointer field communicates the current value of the urgent pointer as a positive offset from the sequence number in this segment. The urgent pointer points to the sequence number of the octet following the urgent data. Under the condition that the URG bit is not set the urgent pointer field is disregarded. This field is only interpreted in segments with the URG control bit set. The stateless model can be used to prevent the misuse of urgent pointer field. This field provides 16 bits for covert channels.
Internet Protocol
The Internet Protocol is a connectionless, best effort packet switching protocol. It provides packet routing, fragmentation, and re-assembly through the data link layer. Idle fields in the IP header are presented below.
• Identification. The 16 bit identification field is set to a different value for each IP datagram and is used for fragmentation and reassembly. The identification field can be used for covert channels when a packet is not being fragmented, the DF (Do not Fragment) bit is set and the MF (More Fragment) bit is zero. In fact, the identification field of unfragmented packets has been one of the choices for the establishment of malicious tunneling between hackers and compromised machines. The use of identification field for malicious tunneling is commonly found in various malicious tools, like DDOS tools. One way to use the stateless model to prevent misuse of the identification field is to enforce a constant value for this field. However, system administrators monitor the identification field to try to detect duplicate packets while analyzing network sniffs. Thus, defining a fixed value may not be an appropriate solution since it will be difficult to differentiate one packet from the other. Therefore, the value of the identification field should be set to a random value if a packet is not getting fragmented. In other words, the stateless model enforces a random number to the identification field if the DF bit is set and the MF bit is zero.
• Flags. The flags field has three bits. The first bit of the flags field is always zero. The other two fields are the do not fragment (DF) bit and more fragment (MF) bit already mentioned above. An IP packet should not be fragmented if the DF bit is set. If a router needs to fragment a packet and the DF bit is set, then it will discard the packet and send an ICMP "fragmentation needed but DF set" (ICMP type 3, code 4) error message to the sending station. The stateless model enforces that the first bit of the flags field is always zero and that if the DF bit is set then the MF bit has to be zero. The stateless model is very appropriate to prevent malicious covert channels that make use of the flags field.
• Fragment offset. If an IP packet is a fragment of a datagram that has been fragmented, the fragment offset indicates the location of the fragment in the final datagram. Packets that are not getting fragmented have the DF bit set. The fragment offset field can provide 13 bits for covert channel when the DF bit is set. The stateless model enforces that the value of the fragment offset field is a constant V when the DF bit is set.
• IP Options. The options field is 40 bytes in length.
These options provide various functionalities. Examples of IP options include: timestamps, record route, loose source route, and strict source route, as defined in RFC 791. The format of the IP options varies depending on the option, however if multiple options are included (more than one option may be included in an IP header), padding must be used to ensure that option data is padded to end on a 32-bit boundary, and the IP header ends on a 32-bit boundary. The stateless model enforces that the value of the padding be a constant V . One potential covert channel that uses the options field is to use the correct option type and pass malicious information in the option data field. This kind of covert channel cannot be prevented by the stateless model since there is no way to discern non-malicious from malicious data but for very trivial cases. Intrusion detection systems and/or state preserving firewalls may be needed if this scenario happens. IDS and state preserving firewalls have to scan the content of the IP option field and raise an alarm in the case of suspicious payload. In fact, even IDS and state preserving firewalls may have difficulty in detecting this kind of malicious activity.
Internet Control Message Protocol
ICMP packets are used by system administrators to check the status of networks. ICMP packets provide various unused fields that can be used to transmit and receive • Destination unreachable-This message is generated when there is some problem delivering packets.
• Time exceeded-This message is sent when the counter is stuck in the looping, or bad congestion.
• Parameter problem-This message is generated when there are illegal header values.
• Source quench-This message is generated for congestion control.
• Redirect-This message is generated to correct routing problems.
• Echo request/echo reply-This message is used for debugging network routing problems, and discovering topology (used by ping).
• Timestamp, timestamp reply-This message is the same as echo, but with performance measurement. The detailed header structure of each message is addressed in RFC 792. It will not be discussed in this paper due to space limitations. Table 2 shows idle field bits in each of the messages and what value the stateless model enforces for these fields.
From Table 2 , it can be seen that the destination unreachable, time exceeded and source quench messages each have 32 unused bits. The parameter problem message has 24 unused bits and echo_request and echo_reply messages have the size of the idle fields and increase with the increase of the message size. The stateless model can easily prevent the misuse of idle fields in each of the messages.
Implementation
A solution to prevent misuse of idle fields in TCP/IP and ICMP messages should:
• Enable administrators to use protocols freely.
• Work for every machine connected to Internet. To achieve these objectives, the stateless model should be a part of the operating system. Because of the freely available source code for Linux, this operating system was chosen for a test bed implementation of the proposed solution. The Linux Netfilter [18] framework was used to extend the existing functionality within the kernel. Netfilter is a set of hooks inside the Linux 2.4.x kernel's network stack that allows kernel modules to register callback functions that are called when a network packet traverses one of the predefined hooks. The callback functions will execute as if they were part of the packet processing pipeline directly. In particular, Netfilter allows a module to register an IP_POST_ROUTING hook, which is called after a packet has been through the routing table and right before it is delivered to the outgoing interface (typically an Ethernet device). A function, TCP/IP monitor (tcp/ip_mon), was implemented to enforce semantic consistency in TCP/IP idle fields. For ICMP messages, ICMP monitor (icmp_mon) was implemented. tcp/ip_mon and icmp_mon enforces the fixed payload policy for the idle fields, using zero as V . The TCP/IP monitor (tcp_mon) and ICMP monitor (icmp_mon) are registered with the IP_POST_ROUTING handler, allowing tcp/ip_mon and icmp_mon to process all locally outbound packets as well as forwarded packets, since every packet goes through the post routing hook.
The packet is analyzed when it is outbound, so the stateless model will work in the case of packets that are locally generated or are forwarded on behalf of another machine. In fact, the stateless model is even effective against encrypted traffic since it enforces semantic consistency. Hence this patch can eliminate the misuse of idle fields in many points of a network, like in machines that are acting as a gateway, router, and sensor, or as a host.
The module can also be compiled directly into a monolithic kernel. The filter hooks are registered when the modules init routines are called at the boot time, if it was compiled into the kernel. The module cannot be bypassed by user space applications since it does not interact with any. Iptables, the user space command that is used to modify Linux firewalling rules, cannot disable the protection. Iptables is typically used to add and remove filtering rules pertaining to regular TCP/IP packets. Because tcp/ip_mon and icmp_mon are not part of iptables, the only way to disable the scanning is to remove the module (using rmmod), which is not possible if the module is statically compiled into a monolithic kernel. When using a monolithic kernel the machine would have to be rebooted into a different kernel to disable tcp/ip_mon and icmp_mon from operating. The stealth rebooting of a machine into a different kernel is not a trivial task. This task is even more difficulties for gateways and sen-290 sors that are monitoring network traffic and have stringer restrictions and event logs.
The proposed solution, stateless model modules compiled directly into a monolithic kernel, will make it very difficult for an adversary to setup a covert channel on a compromised machine using idle fields, since semantic consistency is enforced by the kernel. The stateless model implemented in the kernel benefits from the fact that there is no way to turn off this functionality by simply terminating or modifying an application, which could easily be done on a compromised machine if packets were queued to a userspace intrusion detection application. Hence, the stateless model is recommended for the kernel used by hosts, sensors, gateways and routers so as to eliminate many misuses of idle fields in TCP/IP and ICMP messages.
Results of the Proposed Solution
The monitor modules parse through the header fields of TCP/IP and ICMP messages based upon the idle fields discussed in sub sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. The stateless model enforces semantic consistency for the idle fields. The icmp_mon and tcp/ip_mon modules were compiled and loaded into a running kernel. The total time from arrival up to when icmp_mon and tcp/ip_mon routines are called is referred to as kernel time, or specifically the time the packet has been traversing inside the kernel packet processing. The total time spent inside the icmp_mon and tcp/ip_mon routines, ignoring the overhead caused by the netfilter hooks will be referred to as the "erase time". Four tests were conducted to evaluate the performance. The first experiment compared the time to process the header field of a protocol with the time spent inside the kernel. The test was conducted for two scenarios, when the monitor was a part of the end host kernel and when it was a part of the router kernel. A dual Pentium III 450 MHz machine with 512 MB of RAM was used for the experiments as a router and as a host machine. These tests were conducted for the idle TCP/IP header fields and for the idle fields in ICMP messages.
The results in Fig. 1 show the time to process TCP/IP header fields when the patch was running on an end host. The number of packets was increased from 1000 to 10,000. From the results it can be seen that time to process the idle fields of TCP/IP remains more or less constant irrespective of the number of packets. This time was measured to be 9 microseconds with a variance of 2 microseconds. It also can be inferred from the graph that the time to enforce the stateless model in the TCP/IP header field is much less than the kernel processing time.
The graph shown in Fig. 2 shows the time to process the TCP/IP header fields vs. number of packets for routers. As before, the routers time to process the header fields for TCP/IP remains constant. It can be observed from Fig. 2 that for the routers, the time to enforce the stateless model is greater than the time to process the packet inside the kernel. The time to process the packet inside the kernel was measured to be 4 microseconds. The result shown in Fig. 3 shows the time to enforce the stateless model for ICMP packets in the case of routers. Destination unreachable messages were used for 291 the experiments shown in the graph. Since the number of idle fields is constant for ICMP messages, the time to enforce semantic consistency will remain constant. For the routers, the time to process the packet inside the kernel is less than the time to enforce the stateless model for idle fields.
The graph shown in Fig. 4 shows the time to enforce the stateless model for ICMP messages inside an end hosts. As before, only destination unreachable messages were used. It can be inferred from the graph that the time to process the ICMP message is less than the kernel time. From the experiments performed, the following inferences can be drawn:
• For end hosts, the time to enforce semantic consistency of the idle fields for TCP/IP and for the ICMP messages is much less than the kernel time.
• For routers, the time to enforce semantic consistency for the idle fields for TCP/IP idle fields and for the ICMP messages is greater than the kernel time. In the case of routers, packets get an initial timestamp after it has been fully received by the driver. Then the kernel simply looks at the ip dst field and adds the packet buffer to the output queue, which is a simple pointer assignment. Thus, the total kernel processing time is marginal, a few microseconds, as compared to the time to enforce the stateless model. Hence, the overhead to enforce the stateless model is greater than the kernel processing time for routers.
• The time to enforce the stateless model for TCP/IP and ICMP messages header fields remains the same regardless of whether a flood of packets were sent or packets were sent one by one. The constant time can be attributed to two main factors: 1. Firstly the kernel maintains pre allocated memory structures to store incoming packets. The memory to store packets is allocated by the kernel before the packets come in. When a large number of packets are received, the needed memory is pulled off a queue of empty packet structures. 2. Secondly the size of the fields inspected and written remains constant. The relatively low overhead of performing basic sanity check on TCP/IP fields compared to the total time taken to process a packet (33 microseconds) in end hosts shows that a stateless model is a viable option to prevent the misuse of idle fields. For routers, the overhead of using the stateless model may seem too high. However, given the benefits, the use of the stateless model is justifiable in many scenarios.
Echo_request/echo_reply
ICMP echo_request/echo_reply messages provide idle fields with variable size. Since the size is variable it provides sufficient bandwidth to carry large size information, like commands. The misuse of echo_request/echo_reply messages has been reported as a very high-risk security threat by ISS [1] and SANS [7] . One way to prevent covert channels, in the case of echo_request/echo_reply, is to simply truncate the data field. However, the truncation of the data field will require amendments in the RFC that supports data field for echo_request/echo_reply messages [19, 20] . Erasing (setting to zero) the data field of echo_request/echo_reply messages is compliant with RFC's and prevents ICMP covert channels.
In addition to providing the stateless model, the icmp_mon module implemented scans the data field of ICMP messages for trivial signatures that indicate malicious activities.
The scan capability was implemented to test the ability of the implemented modules to perform additional functions, and because of the large bandwidth ICMP messages can provide to covert channels.
The icmp_mon module calls at runtime icmp_mon_echo_scan to scan packets for predefined strings, and icmp_mon_echo_erase to zero out unused portions of ICMP messages. imcp_mon_echo_scan raises an alarm when it detects some suspicious content in the data portion of the packet. The packet is then forwarded to the icmp_mon_echo_erase. Irrespective of the fact that it is carrying some malicious strings, the data field of echo_request/echo_reply is filled with zeros. Thus the proposed solution can stop malicious traffic even when the signature is not known. Fig. 5 shows the pseudo algorithm that performs those actions.
Results of the Proposed Solution for echo_ request/echo_reply
The proposed solution was implemented and several times were measured. The time referred as kernel time carries the same definition as before. The time for scanning the data field of packets will be referred as scanning time while the time for zeroing the data field will be referred as erasing time. The overheads introduced by the Net filter hooks are ignored. Measurements were taken using machines acting as end hosts and routers. For each measurement, the time to 292 process packets of fixed size in the kernel was compared with the scan and erase time. The measurements on host and router machines were repeated with packets of different lengths. All the measurements were performed using the standard Unix "ping" command, which was run as "ping -c Count -s Size -f host," where the Count and Size were either fixed or varied depending on the measurement. The "−f" option was used to flood ping. The icmp_mon module added the processing times for a given number of packets (corresponding to the Count given to the ping command) and the mean time was calculated after the given number of packets had passed through. The gettimeofday() call was used to get the time, which on the Intel platform has the granularity of microseconds.
The graph shown in Fig. 6 presents the performance associated with the string scanning routine of the icmp_mon. The size of the packet was increased from 100 bytes to 1200 bytes and the time to process 1000 packets of each size was measured and plotted in the graph. The measurements were performed both for the router and for the end host. The simple words searched for were "passwd," "root," "tmp," "etc," "ls," and "dir." They were never present in the ping packets thus the scans never raised any alarms. As per the graph for the router, the scan time is higher than the time to process packets. As already explained, in routers the machine is simply receiving the packets in one interface and sending them out another, which makes the kernel time very small. In the case of the end host, the time to process a packet increases with the packet size, however the processing time is small compared to the kernel time. The scan time shows a marginal increase with the packet size increase, remaining practically constant after the size reaches 700 bytes.
The graph in Fig. 7 shows the time taken for scanning ICMP data fields of fixed size of 84 bytes. The number of packets was increased from 10 to 10,000 and the scan time was plotted. As the number of back-to-back packets increases (due to the ping flood) the end host kernel time per packet decreases. The kernel time goes down because the flood of packets allows the kernel routines to grab multiple packets back to back without returning to a different routine (thus loosing time due to context switching). When the machine is acting as a router, the scan time is again higher than the time to process a packet by the kernel. The scan time shows a marginal increase as the number of packets increases.
The results shown in Fig. 8 present the average time spent inside the kernel and the icmp_mon erase routine when the modules are running on a router and on an end host. The measurements were taken by keeping the number of ICMP packet to 1000 packets for each size and increasing the size of packets from 84 bytes to 1200 bytes. The time to process packets inside the kernel for 293 an end host increases almost linearly as the packet size increases. The size increase has no perceptible effect on the processing time for end routers. The time spent on the added routines, the erasing time, increases marginally up to about 700 byte packets and then remains constant. The erase time increases around 5 microseconds for routers and around 3 microseconds for end host kernels when the size of packets is increased from 84 to 1200 bytes.
The results shown in Fig. 9 present the performance results of the erase time when using fixed packet size. As the number of back to back packets increases (due to ping flood) the kernel time per packet shows a slight decrease but the erase time shows a very low variance. As already discussed, the decrease in the kernel time is due to the loss in context switching. The increase in the time to erase 10,000 packets as compared to 1000 packets is very small and can be considered constant. Figure 9 . Erasing Time vs. kernel time for fixed size packets.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the performance measurements presented.
• For routers, the packets get the initial time stamp after it has been fully recorded by the driver. Then the kernel simply looks at the ip dst field and adds the packet buffer to the output queue, which is a simple pointer assignment. Thus the total kernel processing time is marginal, a few microseconds, as compared to the scan and erase time. This means that the overhead for scanning/erasing is much higher in comparison.
• For end hosts, the scan and erase times are very small as compared to the total time to process the packet.
• For fixed size packets, the scan and erase time remains constant or shows a very low variance as the number of packets increases.
• As the packet size increases from 84 bytes to 1200 bytes the scan and erase time increases. The worst-case increase was observed to be 5 microseconds.
Conclusion
The misuse of high bandwidth malicious fields to establish covert channels is becoming an increasing trend for various software. Kernel modifications have been proposed to prevent misuse of idle fields. From the empirical studies it can be inferred that:
• For the end hosts, the time to enforce semantic consistency of the idle fields for TCP/IP and ICMP messages is less than the kernel time.
• For the routers, the time to enforce semantic consistency for TCP/IP and ICMP messages is much higher than the kernel time.
• For echo_request/echo_reply messages, as the packet size increase the time to enforce semantic consistency increases. The increase in kernel time is linear.
The presented results show that simply marking out unused and potentially dangerous portions of TCP/IP and ICMP messages is a straightforward task that requires little overhead. This is a recommended procedure for end hosts and routers. If the proposed solution becomes an integral part of kernels in operating systems like Solaris, Windows, and Linux running at host machines then routers will not have to examine every TCP/IP and ICMP message that it comes across. The proposed modifications are only for the end hosts and for the routers. 
